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1 How an abductive problem arises?
What is abductive reasoning and when is it used? First, it is a kind of inference.
In a broad sense, a logical inference is any operation that, starting with some
information, allows us to obtain some other information. People are continually
doing inference. For example, I cannot remember which of the two keys in my
pocket opens the door of my house. I try with the first one but it does not
open. So I conclude that it should be the other. In this case, the inference
starts with some data (premises): one of the two keys opens the door, but the
first I tried did not open. I reach some new information (conclusion): it is the
second key.
Inference (or reasoning) does not always follow the same way. In the ex-
ample, if I know that one of the keys opens my house and I cannot open with
the first key, it is necessary that the second opens. When this is the case (that
is, the conclusion follows necessarily from the premises), then we are facing a
deductive inference. Given that the conclusion is a necessary consequence of
the premises, there is no doubt that the conclusion is true, whenever premises
are all true: the door must be opened with the second key.
But there are many contexts in which we cannot apply deductive reasoning.
Sometimes, we use it but we become surprised by the outcome. What happens
if finally the second key does not open the door? This kind of surprise was
studied by the philosopher Charles S. Peirce as the starting point of abductive
reasoning:
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The surprising fact, C, is observed;
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course,
Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true. (CP 5.189, 1903 ).
Peirce mentions a surprising fact, C, that in our example is that none of the
keys opens the door, despite we strongly believed that one of them was the right
one. This is an abductive problem: a surprising fact that we cannot explain
with our current knowledge. Then, we search for a solution, an explanation A
that would stop C from being surprising. To discover this A we put into play
our knowledge about how things usually happen. For example, we may realise
that maybe someone locked the door from the inside. Also, if someone usually
locks the door from the inside, then the explanation becomes stronger and, as
Peirce says, there is reason to suspect that it is true.
Not all abductive problems are identical. A common distinction is between
novel and anomalous abductive problems [3]. A novel abductive problem is
produced when the surprise produced by C is coherent with our previous infor-
mation. Contrary, in an anomalous abductive problem we previously thought
that C could not be the case, and the surprise contradicts our previous belief.
The example of the key that does not open the door is a case of anomalous
abductive problem.
To clarify the notions, we now offer some informal definitions of the con-
cepts that are commonly used in the logical study of abductive reasoning [13].
Suppose that the symbol ⊢ represents our reasoning ability, so that A,B ⊢ C
means that from premises A and B it is possible to infer C by a necessary in-
ference (deduction, as explained above). The negated symbol, as in A,B 6⊢ C,
means that the conclusion C cannot be obtained from premises A and B.
Also, consider that Θ is a set of sentences (logical propositions) representing
our knowledge (that I have two keys, one of them is the right one, etc.) and
ϕ is the surprising fact (none of the keys opens the door). Then, in a novel
abductive problem (Θ, ϕ) the following holds:
1. Θ 6⊢ ϕ
2. Θ 6⊢ ¬ϕ
The first condition is necessary for ϕ to be surprising: it does not follow from
our previous knowledge. The second condition is specific for a novel abduc-
tive problem: the negation (the opposite) of ϕ, represented by ¬ϕ, does not
follow from our knowledge Θ. So, in a novel abductive problem our previous
knowledge was not useful to predict either the surprising fact ϕ or the contrary
¬ϕ.
In an anomalous abductive problem (Θ, ϕ), the conditions that are satisfied
are the following:
1. Θ 6⊢ ϕ
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2. Θ ⊢ ¬ϕ
Now, although the first condition is the same, the second is different: our
previous knowledge Θ predicted ¬ϕ, the negation of the surprising fact ϕ.
2 How an abductive problem is solved?
Logicians say that in deductive reasoning the conclusion is contained in the
premises. This means that the information given by the conclusion is implied
by the information in the premises. For example, the information that one of
my keys open the door but the first does not open contains the information that
the second key will open. But this does not happen in abductive reasoning:
the information that the door is locked from the inside is not implied by the
information of my keys not opening the door. So, abductive reasoning raises
conclusions that introduce new information not present in the premises. Be-
cause of this, abduction requires a dose of creativity to propose the solutions.
Moreover, there are frequently several different solutions, and the ability to
select the best of them is required. We will return later to this issue.
We have distinguished two kinds of abductive problems. Now we will com-
ment the kinds of abductive solutions that are usually considered. We denoted
above by (Θ, ϕ) an abductive problem that arises when our knowledge is rep-
resented by Θ and the surprising fact is ϕ. The solution to this problem is
given by some information α such that, together with the previous knowledge
we had, allows us to infer ϕ, logically represented by
Θ, α ⊢ ϕ
This is the minimal condition for an abductive solution α to solve the problem
(Θ, ϕ). Atocha Aliseda [3] calls plain to those abductive solutions satisfying
this requirement.
There are other very interesting kinds of abductive solutions. For example,
consistent solutions satisfy the additional condition of being coherent with our
previous knowledge. It is formally represented by
Θ, α 6⊢ ⊥,
where the symbol ⊥ represents any contradiction. It is important that our
abductive solutions are consistent. Possibly, we will not know whether the
abductive solution α is true, but usually, if it is inconsistent with our previous
knowledge, we have reason to discard it.
Finally, explanatory abductive solutions are those satisfying
α 6⊢ ϕ,
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that is, the surprising fact ϕ cannot be inferred with α alone without using
the knowledge given by Θ. This is to avoid self-contained explanations: the
key idea behind this criterion is that a good abductive explanation offers the
missing piece to solve a certain puzzle, but all the other pieces were previously
given.
When an abductive solution satisfies the three conditions above, we call it
a consistent explanatory solution. To avoid useless or trivial solutions (the key
does not open the door because it does not open it), it is frequent to focus on
consistent explanatory abduction.
The logical study of abductive reasoning has been receiving a notable at-
tention for several years, and many calculi have been proposed for abduction
in different logical systems [6, 13, 16]. Now, we are not interested in offering
a specific calculus for a particular logic, but in looking to an old problem in
abductive reasoning: the selection of the best hypothesis. Which is the best
abductive solution? First, we will proceed conceptually, by introducing some
notions from information theory. It will be in Section 4 when, as an example,
we will apply the introduced idea in the context of epistemic logic.
3 Which is the least complex explanation?
It may happen that for a certain abductive problem there are several possible
explanations, not all of them mutually compatible. For example, to explain
why the key does not open the door, we have proposed that someone locked
it from the inside. But it could also happen that the key or the door lock
are broken, or that someone changed the lock while we were outside, or made
a joke, etc. It is necessary to select one of the many possible explanations,
because it cannot be that case that all of them happened, it is enough just
one of them to explain that we cannot open the door with our key. What
explanation is selected and which criteria are used to select it? This is the
well-known problem of the selection of abductive hypotheses [17].
Moreover, different to deductive reasoning, abductive conclusions (selected
solutions) are not necessary true. It is easy to observe that, despite we think
that someone locked the door from the inside, it may have not been the case,
and that in fact the lock is broken. So, we usually have to replace an explanation
with another one, when we come to know that the originally chosen is false.
Several criteria have been proposed to solve the problem of the selection of
abductive hypotheses. A common one is minimality, that prefers explanations
assuming fewer pieces of new information. So, if I can solve a certain abductive
problem both assuming α1 or α2, it is possible that I can also solve it by
simultaneously assuming α1 and α2, or maybe α1 and a certain β, but we will
usually discard those options because they are not the simplest possible ones.
In logical terms, if A ⊢ B and both A and B can solve a certain abductive
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problem, we prefer B, given that A is at least equally strong than B, and
maybe stronger, in the sense of assuming more information.
Frequently, the minimality criterion is not enough to select the best expla-
nation. Which one is simpler: to think that someone locked the door from the
inside, or that they spent a joke by changing the door lock?
Are there criteria that can help us to select the simplest explanation in a
broad spectrum of abductive problems? To give an (affirmative) answer to this
question we will move to a field in theoretical computer science: Algorithmic
Information Theory (AIT), which is due to the works of Ray Solomonoff [19, 20],
Andre´i Kolmogo´rov [7], Leonid Levin [9] and Gregory Chaitin [5].
A central notion in AIT is the measure known as Kolmogo´rov complexity, or
algorithmic complexity. To understand it, let us compare these two sequences
of 0s and 1s:
0101010101010101010101010101010101010101
0001101000100110111101010010111011100100
If we were asked which one of them is simpler, we will answer that the first
one. Why? It is built up from 20 repetitions of the pattern 01. The second
sequence is a random string. The difference between the regularity of the first
sequence and the randomness of the second one is related with one property:
the first sequence has a much shorter description than the second. The first
sequence can be described as ‘twenty repetitions of 01’, while the second one
can be hardly described with a description shorter than itself.
The idea behind the notion of Kolmogo´rov complexity is that if some object
O can be fully described with n bits (bit : binary digit, information unit), then
O does not contain more information. So the shorter description of the object O
indicates how much information is contained in O. We would like to measure in
this way the complexity of abductive solutions, and introduce an informational
minimality criterion: we select the least complex explanation, that is, the least
informative one. But we will look at how this complexity measure is quantified.
Kolmogo´rov uses the concept of universal Turing machine [21]. An universal
Turing machine (UTM) M is a programmable device capable of implementing
any algorithm. The important point for us now is that the machine M , similar
to our computers, takes a program p, runs it and eventually (if the computation
stops) produces a certain output o. To indicate that o is the output produced
by UTM M with program p we write M(p) = o. Then, for a certain string of
characters s, we define its Kolmogo´rov complexity, KM (s), as
KM (s) = min {l(p) |M(p) = s, p is a program}
where l(p) is the length in bits of the program p. That is, KM (s) is equal to
the size of the shorter program producing s in the UTM M . The subindex
M in KM (s) means that its value depends on the choice of UTM, because
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not all of them interpret the programs in the same way, despite all having the
same computational power. If we choose another machine M ′ instead of M ,
it can happen that KM ′(s) is pretty different to KM (s). However, these bad
news are only relative, given that the Invariance Theorem guarantees that the
difference between KM (s) and KM ′(s) is always lower than a certain constant
not depending on s, but on M and M ′. So, as we face more and more complex
strings, it is less relevant the choice of UTM. Then, we can simply write K(s)
to denote the Kolmogo´rov complexity of s.
The use of Turing machines and programs allows us to set an encoding to
describe any computable (that is, that can be produced by some algorithm)
object O. Then, for the first binary sequence above, the shortest description
will not be ‘twenty repetitions of 01’ (26 characters) but the shortest program
producing that string.
To approach the relation between algorithmic complexity and abductive
reasoning, we can look at the work of Ray Solomonoff, that conceives algorith-
mic complexity as a tool to create a model that explains all the regularities in
the observed universe (see [19], Section 3.2). The idea of Solomonoff is ambi-
tious, but it is in line with the common postulates of the inference to the best
explanation [11]. A theory can be conceived as a set of laws (axioms, hypothe-
ses, etc., depending on the kind of theory) trying to give account of a set of
observations in a given context. The laws in the theory try to explain the regu-
larities in those observations. So, what is the best theory? From Solomonoff’s
point of view, the best theory is the most compact one, that describing the
highest number of observations (the most general one) with the fewest number
of postulates (the most elegant from a logical point of view). It is the condition
for the lowest algorithmic complexity. The best theory is then conceived as the
shortest program generating the observations that we want to explain. Such
generation consist of the inferential mechanism underlying the postulates of
the theory. If it were a set of logical rules, the execution of the program given
by the theory is equivalent to what logicians denote by the deductive closure
of the theory: the set of all consequences that can be deduced from the the-
ory axioms. Such execution does not always finish in a finite number of steps,
because logical closures frequently (always in classical logic) are infinite sets,
but usually there are procedures (in decidable logical systems) that, in a finite
number of steps, check whether a certain formula belongs to such closure.
As we can see, the algorithmic complexity measure K(s) can be used to de-
termine which is the best theory within those explaining a set of observations.
However, the problem with K(s) is its uncomputability: there is no algorithm
such that, given the object s (a binary string or a set of observations) returns,
in a finite number of steps, the value K(s) (the size of the shortest program
producing s, or the smallest theory explaining our observations). Therefore,
if we can not generally know the value of K(s), we cannot know which is the
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shortest program (or theory) generating the string s (explaining our observa-
tions). The most interesting consequence of the above explanation is that, in
general, the problem of determining which is the best explanation for a given
set of observations is uncomputable (if we understand the best as the most
compact).
However, despite the uncomputability of K(s), there are good approxima-
tions that allow to measure the algorithmic complexity of an object. One of the
most used approximations is based on lossless compression algorithms. These
algorithms are frequently used in our computers to compress documents. A
very common compression algorithm is Lempel-Ziv, on which the ZIP com-
pression format is based. It allows to define a computable complexity measure
that approximates K(s) [8]. If we have some file s and the output of the
compression algorithm is c(s) (it is important to use a lossless compression
algorithm so that when decompressed it produces exactly the original file s),
we can understand c(s) as a program that, when is run in certain computer
(the decompressor program) produces s. So, the length of the compressed file
c(s) is an approximation to K(s). It is not necessary that c(s) is the short-
est possible description of s, as we can consider it an approximation. In fact,
many applications based on c(s) to measure complexity are used in different
disciplines line physics, cryptography or medicine [10].
How can we approximateK(s) to compare the complexity of several abduc-
tive explanations and choose the best one? Compression-based approximations
to K(s) are frequently good when s is a character string. It also happens with
other approximations based on the notion of algorithmic probability [18]. How-
ever, abductive explanations are usually produced in the context of theories
with a structure that can be missed when treated as character strings. How-
ever, we can use several tricks to reproduce some aspects of the structure of
the theories into the structure of the strings. For example, in classical propo-
sitional logic, both sets of formulas A = {p→ q} and B = {¬q → ¬p, ¬p ∨ q}
are equivalent, but if we understand A and B as character sequences and we
compress them, B will probably seem more complex than A. We can avoid this
problem by converting both sets into a normal form, for example the minimal
clausal form—sets (conjunctions) of sets (disjunctions) of literals (propositional
variables or their negations)—which in both cases is {{¬p, q}}.
Another important point to be considered is that the complexity of an ab-
ductive explanation α should be measured related to the context in which it
is proposed: the theory Θ. Hence, K(α) may not be a good approximation to
the complexity of α as an abductive solution to a certain abductive problem
(Θ, ϕ). Because of that, in certain cases it is more reasonable to use the no-
tion of conditional algorithmic complexity K(s | x) measuring the length of the
shortest program that produces s with input x. So, K(α | Θ) would be a better
approximation to the complexity of the abductive solution α (within the theory
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Θ) than just K(α). Using lossless compression, if c(f) represents the compres-
sion of f and |c(f)| is the length in bits of c(f), a common approximation to
K(s | x) is given by |c(xs)| − |c(x)|, where xs represents the concatenation of
x and s. It can be observed that, in general, this approximation gives different
values for K(y | x) and K(x | y), and the value of K(x | x) approaches 0 for an
ideal compressor, given that the size of the compression of xx is almost equal
to the compression of x, only one instruction to repeat all the output has to be
included.
As we can see, the notions of algorithmic complexity make sense to ap-
proach the problem of the complexity of abductive solutions and to tackle with
computational tools the problem of the selection of the best explanation. How-
ever, good choices have to be made about the way to represent the theories (for
example, in clausal form) and which approach to K(s) o K(s | x) is to be used.
We presented above a very simple example on propositional logic where clausal
form can be fine. But other options are also possible. For example, Kripke
frames can be used to represent relations between theories [15]. That way, each
world w represents a possible theory Θw, and the accessibility relation indicates
which modifications can be done to the theories. Then, if world w can access
to u, then Θw can be modified to become Θu. An abductive problem appears
when we are in a certain world w and there is a certain formula ϕ which does
not follow from theory Θw. Then, we solve the abductive problem by moving
to another accessible world u (we modify our theory Θw to get Θu) such that ϕ
is a consequence of Θu. This way we give account of modifications in theories
that go beyond adding new formulas. That is, if does not necessary happen
Θw ⊂ Θu, because the change of theory can entail deeper modifications, for
example in the structural properties of the logical consequence relation. Then,
it may be possible to pass, for example, from Θw with a monotonous reasoning
system, to a non-monotonic reasoning in Θu. However, within all accessible
theories from w that explain ϕ, the problem of determining the least complex
explanation still remains. The complexity measure that should be used here is
K(Θu | Θw) and, among all accessible theories from w explaining ϕ, the one
which minimises this complexity measure should be chosen.
Despite offering resources to compare different abductive solutions and to
choose the simplest one, algorithmic complexity notions have two problems:
(1) to determine a good representation for theories (or formulas) and (2) to
choose a computable approximation to K(s) or K(s | x), through lossless
compression or by other means. In the next section we present an example,
based on epistemic logic, illustrating how we can do this in a specific case.
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4 A proposal using epistemic logic
In this section we introduce an application of K(s) to the selection of the best
abductive explanation, in the context of dynamic epistemic logic (DEL). The
presentation is based on previous papers where we use the same logical tools [14,
17, 12], but the selection criteria are now different. Here, an approximation to
K(s) is applied to choose among several abductive explanations.
One of the possible ways to model the knowledge and belief of an agent is
offered by plausibility models [4]. We start by presenting the semantic notions
that will be later used to propose and solve abductive problems.
Definition 1 (Language L) Given a set of atomic propositions P, formulas
ϕ of the language L are given by
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | 〈≤〉ϕ | 〈∼〉ϕ
where p ∈ P. Formulas of the form 〈≤〉ϕ are read as “there is a world at least
as plausible as the current one where ϕ holds”, and those of the form 〈∼〉ϕ
are read as “there is a world epistemically indistinguishable from the current
one where ϕ holds”. Other Boolean connectives (∧, →, ↔) as well as the
universal modalities, [≤] and [∼], are defined as usual ([≤]ϕ := ¬〈≤〉¬ϕ and
[∼]ϕ := ¬〈∼〉¬ϕ for the latter).
It can be observed that the language L is like propositional logic with two
new modal connectives, 〈≤〉 and 〈∼〉 , that will allow to define the notions of
belief and knowledge. These notions will depend on a plausibility order that
the agent sets among the worlds in the model. We now see how these models
are built.
Definition 2 (Plausibility model) Let P be a set of atomic propositions. A
plausibility model is a tuple M = 〈W,≤, V 〉, where:
• W is a non-empty set of possible worlds
• ≤ ⊆ (W × W ) is a locally connected and conversely well-founded pre-
order1, the agent’s plausibility relation, representing the plausibility or-
der of the worlds from her point of view (w ≤ u is read as “u is at least
as plausible as w”)
• V : W → ℘(P) is an atomic valuation function, indicating the atoms in
P that are true at each possible world.
1A relation R ⊆ (W × W ) is locally connected when every two elements that are R-
comparable to a third are also R-comparable. It is conversely well-founded when there is no
infinite R-ascending chain of elements in W , where R, the strict version of R, is defined as
Rwu iff Rwu and not Ruw. Finally, it is a preorder when it is reflexive and transitive.
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A pointed plausibility model (M,w) is a plausibility model with a distinguished
world w ∈W .
The key idea behind plausibility models is that an agent’s beliefs can be
defined as what is true in the most plausible worlds from the agent’s perspective,
and modalities for the plausibility relation ≤ will allow this definition to be
formed. In order to define the agent’s knowledge, the approach is to assume
that two worlds are epistemically indistinguishable for the agent if and only if
she considers one of them at least as plausible as the other (i.e., if and only
if they are comparable via ≤). The epistemic indistinguishability relation ∼
can therefore be defined as the union of ≤ and its converse, that is, as ∼ :=
≤ ∪ ≥. Thus, ∼ is the symmetric closure of ≤ and hence ≤ ⊆ ∼. Moreover,
since ≤ is reflexive and transitive, ∼ is an equivalence relation. This epistemic
indistinguishability relation∼ should not be confused with the equal plausibility
relation, denoted by ≃, and defined as the intersection of ≤ and ≥, that is, ≃ :=
≤ ∩ ≥. For further details and discussion on these models, their requirements
and their properties, the reader is referred to [4, 23].
Now we can see how a formula is evaluated in a plausibility model. Modal-
ities 〈≤〉 and 〈∼〉 are interpreted in the standard way, using their respective
relations.
Definition 3 (Semantic interpretations) Let (M,w) be a plausibility model
M = 〈W,≤, V 〉 with distinguished world w ∈ W . By (M,w)  ψ we indicate
that the formula ψ ∈ L is true in the world w ∈W . Formally,
(M,w)  p iff p ∈ V (w), for every p ∈ P
(M,w)  ¬ϕ iff (M,w) 1 ϕ
(M,w)  ϕ ∧ ψ iff (M,w)  ϕ and (M,w)  ψ
(M,w)  〈≤〉ϕ iff there exists u ∈W such that w ≤ u and (M,u)  ϕ
(M,w)  〈∼〉ϕ iff there exists u ∈W such that w ∼ u and (M,u)  ϕ
In plausibility models, knowledge is defined using the indistinguishability
relation. So, an agent knows ϕ in some world w iff ϕ is true in all worlds
that cannot be distinguished from w by her, that is, all worlds considered epis-
temically possible for her. However, within those worlds there is a plausibility
order, not all of them are equally plausible for the agent. This is relevant for
the notion of belief: agent believes ϕ in a certain world w iff ϕ is true in the
most plausible worlds that are reachable from w. Due to the properties of the
plausibility relation, ϕ is true in the most plausible worlds iff by following the
plausibility order, from some stage we only reach ϕ-worlds [4]. We can express
this idea with modalities 〈≤〉 and [≤]. Formally2,
2Operator K is commonly used for knowledge. It should not be confused with Kolmogo´rov
complexity K(s) also usually represented by K.
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Agent knows ϕ Kϕ := [∼]ϕ
Agent believes ϕ Bϕ := 〈≤〉 [≤]ϕ
p, q p, q
w1 w2
Figure 1: Example of a plausibility model
Fig. 1 shows a plausibility model exampleM . Plausibility relation ≤ is rep-
resented by arrows between worlds. For the agent, world w2 is more plausible
than w1. In this case, p is true in both worlds, while q is true only in w2 (q
represents that q is false). So, agent knows p in w1 but does not know q, that
is, (M,w1)  Kp ∧ ¬Kq. However, agent believes q, (M,w1)  Bq. Indeed,
she also believes p, (M,w1)  Bp.
If a formula ϕ is true in all the states of a certain model M , then ϕ is valid
in M , represented as M  ϕ. In the example, M  Kp ∧ ¬Kq ∧Bq.
In the logical literature about abduction and belief revision in general [2],
logical operations adding or removing information of the theory are frequently
considered. In the same way, in the context of plausibility models, agents can
perform epistemic actions modifying the agent’s information. We now present
two of the main actions that agents in plausibility models can perform. On of
the actions modifies the knowledge and the other the belief. For more details
about the properties of these actions, see [4].
The first operation, observation, modifies the agent’s knowledge. It is de-
fined in a very natural way: it consists of removing all worlds where the ob-
served formula is not satisfied, so that the domain of the model is reduced.
Definition 4 (Observation) LetM = 〈W,≤, V 〉 be a plausibility model. The
observation of ψ produces the model Mψ! = 〈W
′,≤′, V ′〉 where
W ′ := {w ∈W | (M,w)  ψ}
≤′ := ≤ ∩ (W ′ ×W ′)
V ′(w) := V (w), for each w ∈W ′
This operation removes worlds ofW , keeping only those that satisfy (before
the observation) the observed ψ. The plausibility relation is restricted to the
conserved worlds.
Another operation that agents can do is to modify just the plausibility
relation. It can be done in several ways. The operation we call conjecture is
also known as radical upgrade in the literature.
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Definition 5 (Conjecture) Let M = 〈W,≤, V 〉 be a plausibility model and
ψ a formula. The conjecture of ψ produces the model Mψ⇑ = 〈W,≤
′, V 〉, that
differs from M only in the plausibility relation, which is now,
≤′ :=
{
(w, u) | w ≤ u and (M,u)  ψ
}
∪{
(w, u) | w ≤ u and (M,w)  ¬ψ
}
∪{
(w, u) | w ∼ u and (M,w)  ¬ψ and (M,u)  ψ
}
The new plausibility relation indicates that, after the conjecture of ψ, all
ψ-worlds (before the conjecture) are more plausible than all ¬ψ-worlds. The
previous order between ψ-worlds or between ¬ψ-worlds does not change [22].
This operation preserves the properties of the plausibility relation, as shown
in [23].
We now discuss how an abductive problem can appear and be solved within
the plausibility models formalism. In the classical definition of abductive prob-
lem, formula ϕ is an abductive problem because it is not entailed by the theory
Θ. But, where does ϕ come from? For Peirce, ϕ is an observation, that is, it
comes from an agent’s epistemic action. As we have seen in Def. 4, the action
of observing ϕ can be modelled in DEL. What does it mean, then, that ϕ is
an abductive problem? After observing ϕ, if it is a propositional formula, the
agent knows ϕ, so we cannot affirm that an abductive problem arises when
the agent does not know ϕ. However, we can go back to the moment before
observing ϕ; if the agent did not know ϕ, then after the observation it becomes
an abductive problem. Formally,
ϕ is an abductive problem in (Mϕ!, w) iff (M,w) 1 Kϕ (1)
This definition of abductive problem within plausibility models is in line with
Peirce’s idea that an abductive problem appears when the agent observes ϕ.
The notion of abductive problem in (1) has been defined in terms of knowl-
edge. If could have been defined in terms of belief too, considering that ϕ is an
abductive problem in (Mϕ!, w) iff (M,w) 1 Bϕ. Then, the condition for ϕ to
be an abductive problem becomes stronger than in (1), because ¬Bϕ implies
¬Kϕ.
Now the notion of abductive solution can also be interpreted in the plausi-
bility models semantics. According to Peirce’s idea, the agent knows that if ψ
were true, then the truth of the surprising fact ϕ would be obvious. It is ex-
pressed in DEL by requiring that the agent knows ψ → ϕ, that is, K(ψ → ϕ).
Then, when the agent faces an abductive problem ϕ and knows ψ → ϕ, how
does she solve it? Again, Peirce says that there is reason to suspect that ψ is
true. We now discuss what does ‘to suspect’ ψ mean in DEL and how can it
be modelled as an epistemic action.
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Something not usually considered within logical approaches to abductive
reasoning is how to integrate the solution. Maybe because in classical logic
there is no way to suspect a formula. But in epistemic logic there are beliefs.
It is an information kind weaker than knowledge, as we have seen. So, belief
seems the most natural candidate to model the suspicion. In line with Peirce,
we then distinguish the agent’s knowledge of ψ → ϕ from her belief in ψ.
But for a reasonable suspicion, as Peirce requires, it is necessary that the
agent knows ψ → ϕ. Joining all the presented ideas, given abductive problem
ϕ in (Mϕ!, w) (see (1)), formula ψ is a solution for it iff
(M,w)  K(ψ → ϕ) (2)
Condition (Mϕ!, w)  K(ψ → ϕ) cannot be required because it is trivially
verified in all cases in which ϕ is a propositional formula, as it becomes known
after being observed, so the agent knows also ψ → ϕ for every ψ.
What does the agent do to suspect ψ? The most adequate abductive action
to integrate ψ into the agent’s information is to conjecture ψ (def. 5). In this
way, ψ is integrated into the agent’s information as a belief.
p, q p, q
p, q
w1 w2
w3
q!
=⇒
p, q
p, q
w1
w2
p ⇑
=⇒
p, q
p, q
w1
w2
Figure 2: Solving an abductive problem
Fig. 2 shows an example of the whole explained process. In the model
of the left, K(p→ q) is verified, but also ¬Kq. In the central model, after
observing q agent knows q, and of course she continues knowing p→ q, that is,
Kq ∧K(p→ q). Then, q is an abductive problem, given that the agent knows
it after the observation but not before. A possible solution is then p. After
the abductive action of conjecturing p, the model on the right shows that the
agent believes p, Bp, given that p is true in the most plausible world.
Briefly, (1) shows the condition for ϕ being an abductive problem and (2)
for ψ being a solution for it. As we have proposed, is it reasonable to conjecture
the abductive solution as a belief (def. 5).
We are now ready to use Kolmogo´rov complexity as a selection criterion
within solutions of an abductive problem. First, observe that a binary relation
R over a set {l1, l2, . . . , ln} can be represented as a binary matrix A with di-
mension n×n. In such matrix, each cell ai,j is equal to 1 iff (li, lj) ∈ R and is 0
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otherwise. For example, consider relation R = {(1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 1), (2, 3), (3, 1)}
over the set {1, 2, 3}. The matrix representing R is


1 1 0
1 0 1
1 0 0


Given a matrix A, its Kolmogo´rov complexity3 K(A) can be approximated for
example using lossless compression 4. The least complex relations are equally
the empty relation (all the matrix is filled with 0s) and the total relation (all
filled with 1s). Those are the most compressible matrices. Other very regu-
lar relations, as that containing only pairs (e, e) for each element e (diagonal
matrix), are also quite compressible. The more random a relation is, the more
random is the obtained matrix and the less compressible it is.
In addition to approximate the value of K(A) for a given matrix A, com-
pression allows us to approximate K(B | A), given matrices A and B. To do
that, the concatenation of A and B (in this order) is first compressed and then
A alone is also compressed. The difference of the size of both files approximates
K(B | A). This approximation to K(B | A) can be used to determine which is
the best abductive solution in the context of plausibility models.
Consider an abductive problem ϕ in (Mϕ!, w), and two competing explana-
tions ψ1 and ψ2 for it. The argument below can be extended to any number
of competing explanations. Which of both explanations will be chosen? It was
explained below that the way to integrate an abductive explanation ψi is to
conjecture ψi in the model (Mϕ!, w) (def. 5). The effect of conjecturing ψi is
only to modify the plausibility relation of Mϕ!. Then, which is the best expla-
nation? The answer offered by the notion of algorithmic complexity if that the
best explanation is the one modifying the model (the plausibility relation) in
the least complex way: this is not the one making the smallest modification,
but the modification with the shortest description given the initial model. If
Aϕ! is the matrix representing the plausibility relation ofMϕ! and Aψi the ma-
trix for the plausibility relation of (Mϕ!)ψi⇑, then the best explanation is the
one minimising the value of
K(Aψi | Aϕ!) (3)
The explanation minimising (3) is the one having the shortest description5
starting at the plausibility relation for the agent after observing ϕ.
3Now K is used for algorithmic complexity and not for knowledge as in previous para-
graphs.
4Lossless compression approximations are not good for small matrices as the one
in the example, because habitual compressors cannot detect regularities in very short
binary sequences. For small matrices, it is more convenient to use the tools pre-
sented in [18, 24] also available at The Online Algorithmic Complexity Calculator:
http://www.complexitycalculator.com/.
5Formally, the chosen solution ψ is the one, among all possible solutions, that minimises
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This methodology cannot be applied to small epistemic models, as those
in the previous examples, because compression is not a good approximation to
the complexity of small matrices. But it can be applied to models of medium
and large size appearing in applications of DEL to multi-agent systems. For
small models there are other methods that can be applied [24], only changing
in the way to approximate K(s).
5 Discussion
Ray Solomonoff, one of the drivers of algorithmic information theory, was con-
vinced that the notion of algorithmic complexity can be used to define a system
explaining all the observed regularities in the Universe. But there are strong
limitations that make impossible to build such a system, mainly the uncom-
putability of K(s). However, by using computable approximations, though not
being able to build a system explaining all the regularities in the Universe, it
is possible, in a specific context (plausibility models for us), to establish cri-
teria based on K(s) (and its conditional version) that allow to select the best
explanation among the possible ones.
There are still many issues to explore. For example, it would be inter-
esting to study the relevance of the notion of facticity introduced by Pieter
Adriaans [1]. He considers K(s) the sum of two terms, one is the structural
information of s and the other the ad hoc information in s. Then the best
explanation could be selected by specially looking at the contained structural
information. Also, algorithmic complexity measures can be combined with
other common selection criteria that avoid triviality. Ideally, the least complex
solution should be selected among all possible consistent and explanatory ones.
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